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Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 905 F.3d 565 (9th Cir. 2018) 
 
Connlan W. Whyte 
 
 Throughout the twentieth century, Teck Cominco Metals leaked 
metal pollutants into the Upper Columbia River that ultimately entered the 
United States and the Colville Indian Reservation. In 2004, after almost a 
decade of working with the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency, the Colville Tribes initiated a citizen suit under CERCLA against 
Teck for damaging the ecosystem of the Upper Columbia River. In 2018, 
the Ninth Circuit affirmed judgment against Teck for recovery costs and 
attorney’s fees.  
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd.,1 the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Washington’s decision finding the de-
fendant, Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd. (“Teck”), a Canadian mining corpo-
ration,  jointly and severely liable under the Comprehensive Environmen-
tal Response, Compensation, and Liability Act2 (“CERCLA”).3 The initial 
plaintiffs who served on the Colville tribal council—and were later joined 
by the Colville Tribes (“Tribes”) and the State of Washington—brought a 
CERCLA citizen suit against Teck, claiming that Teck’s slag significantly 
damaged the Upper Columbia River.4 Teck argued that it was not liable 
under CERCLA5 and the district court lacked jurisdiction in certifying the 
appeal by entering partial judgment.6 Teck also contested the awards of 
recovery costs and attorney’s fees and challenged whether the Tribes could 
recover those costs under CERCLA’s “removal”7 costs provision.8 Find-
ing those arguments unpersuasive, the Ninth Circuit held it had jurisdic-
tion over Teck,9 upholding summary judgment against the company in re-
jecting all its claims and defenses10 and declaring Teck fully liable under 





1.  905 F.3d 565, 566 (9th Cir. 2018). 
2.  42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2018). 
3. Pakootas, 905 F.3d at 596.  
4  Id.  
5.  Id. at 574.  
6.  Id. at 574, 577 (referencing FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b)). 
7.        42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A). 
8.  Pakootas, 905 F.3d at 578 (relying on United States v. Chapman, 
146 F.3d 1166, 1174 (9th Cir. 1998)). 
9.  Id. at 587. 
10.  Id. at 587, 594, 596. 
11.  Id. at 586, 596. 
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II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Years prior to the suit, the Tribes petitioned the Environmental 
Protection Agency (“EPA”) to conduct testing on the Upper Columbia 
River to determine if Teck damaged the river system.12 In 1999, the EPA 
completed its investigation and ordered Teck to perform “a remedial in-
vestigation and feasibility study”13 on the site in accordance with CER-
CLA.14 Teck disputed the findings of the investigation, and the EPA chose 
not to enforce the order after negotiating with Teck.15 In response, tribal 
council members filed a CERCLA citizen suit, to which the State of Wash-
ington intervened and the Tribes later joined as co-plaintiffs.16  
Seeking to dismiss the claim, Teck argued that CERCLA did not 
apply extraterritorially to its foreign activities and that it did not “arrange[] 
for disposal” of its pollutants into the Upper Columbia River.17 The district 
court denied Teck’s motion to dismiss and certified an interlocutory ap-
peal, seeking to advance the ultimate termination of litigation on the ques-
tion of whether CERCLA applied extraterritorially.18 While the interlocu-
tory appeal progressed, Teck and the EPA settled, agreeing that Teck 
would conduct an investigation and feasibility study on the site; however, 
the agreement did not require Teck to clean up the site.19 
 In 2006, the Ninth Circuit accepted Teck’s interlocutory appeal 
and upheld the districts court’s rejection of Teck’s motion to dismiss.20 
The court then held that the case did not involve an extraterritorial appli-
cation of CERCLA, as “Teck’s pollution had ‘come to be located’ in the 
United States.”21 On remand, the case was trifurcated into three phases to 
ascertain: “(1) whether Teck [was] liable as a potentially responsible party 
(‘PRP’); (2) Teck’s liability for response costs; and (3) Teck’s liability for 
natural resource damages.”22 Teck sought a divisibility defense under 
CERCLA.23 Prior to the first bench trial, both parties filed cross motions 
for partial summary judgment as to Teck’s defense; the district court 
granted the motion,24 while the State of Washington settled its dispute with 
Teck before trial in the second phase.25 On summary judgment, the district 
court found  Teck liable as a PRP under CERCLA’s arranger liability 
 
12.  Id. at 573. 
13.  Id. 
14.  42 U.S.C. § 9604 (2018). 
15.  Pakootas, 905 F.3d at 573. 
16.  Id. 
17.  Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9607).   
18.  Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). 
19.  Pakootas, 905 F.3d at 573. 
20.  Id.; see Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066 (9th 
Cir. 2006) 
21.  Pakootas, 905 F.3d at 573 (citing Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Met-
als, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9)) 
22.  Id.  
23.  Id.  
24.  Id. at 573–74. 
25.  Id. at 574. 
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provision, while also holding Teck responsible for response costs and in-
terest totaling $8,597,976.65 after the phase two trial.26 Teck then appealed 
the district court’s summary judgment order dismissing of its divisibility 




On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that: (1) partial judgment against 
Teck for liability under CERCLA’s response cost provision was proper;28 
(2) the State of Washington correctly exercised specific personal jurisdic-
tion upon Teck because the company aimed waste into the Upper Colum-
bia River slightly north of the United States and Canada border;29 (3) the 
Tribes could recover investigation costs under CERCLA’s definition of 
pollutant “removal”;30 (4)  the Tribes’ attorney fees award was correct;31 





 First, Teck argued that partial judgment on response costs under 
Rule 54(b) was not allowable until the conclusion of the “entire . . . litiga-
tion” because the multiple remedies arose under one CERCLA claim.33 
Second, Teck argued the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over it 
because the court did not correctly apply the Calder v. Jones “‘effects’ 
test”34 and, alternatively, because Teck’s pollution was not “expressly 
aimed at Washington.”35 
 With respect to the first challenge, Teck argued that the district 
court incorrectly adjudicated the Tribes’ response costs.36 Teck asserted 
that adjudicating the Tribes’ response costs claim cannot occur until the 
completion of the entire litigation.37 However, the Ninth Circuit deter-
mined that a claim consists of “a set of facts giving rise to legal rights in 
the claimant.”38 The court further reasoned that the Tribes’ claims for re-
sponse costs and natural resource damages require proof of different sets 
of facts, thus constituting separate claims.39 Therefore, the circuit court 
 
26.  Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3)). 
27.  Id. 
28.  Id. at 576. 
29.  Id. at 577–78. 
30.  Id. at 582 (relying on 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(23), (25)). 
31.  Id. at 586. 
32.  Id. at 596. 
33.  Id. at 574.  
34.  Id. at 576 (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984)). 
35.  Id. at 577. 
36.  Id. at 574. 
37.  Id. 
38.  Id. at 575 (quoting CMAX, Inc. v. Drewry Photocolor Corp., 295 
F.2d 695, 697 (9th Cir. 1961)). 
39.  Id. at 576.  
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upheld the district court’s certification under Rule 54(b),  finding no abuse 
of discretion.40 
 On the personal jurisdiction challenge, Teck argued that the dis-
trict court erred in applying the Calder test41 because Teck did not aim its 
slag at the state of Washington.42 The court stated that the Calder test con-
sists of three prongs: “(1) [the defendant] . . . committed an intentional act, 
(2) [the act was] expressly aimed at the forum state, [and] (3) [the act] 
caus[ed] harm that the defendant kn[ew] [wa]s likely to be suffered in the 
forum state.”43  
Further, the court reasoned that it must liberally interpret the lan-
guage “expressly aimed” and that Teck could have anticipated being 
brought to court within Washington.44 Based on the evidence in the record, 
the court determined Teck knew that the Columbia River carried its waste 
into Washington—and that the waste had damaged Washington since the 
1980s—yet Teck continued to dump waste into the river.45 Accordingly, 
the Ninth Circuit held the district court correctly applied the Calder test to 
find personal jurisdiction over Teck.46 
 
B. Investigatory Cost Recovery and Attorney’s Fees 
 
 Teck then challenged the district court’s decision allowing the 
Tribes to recover both investigatory costs and attorney’s fees.47 The dis-
trict court determined that the Tribes’ investigation costs were a removal 
action and thus awardable.48 Teck also argued that the investigation costs 
established their initial liability, thus making them “litigation-related,” im-
plicitly outside of “removal” under CERCLA, and not rewardable.49  On 
appeal, Teck argued that CERCLA does not allow for the direct recovery 
of attorney’s fees. 50 
Finding Teck’s argument unpersuasive, the Ninth Circuit disa-
greed with Teck’s interpretation of  a removal action, stating CERCLA 
defines it as “‘the cleanup or removal’ of hazardous substances.”51 Further, 
the court stated that what constitutes removal faces a “low bar.”52 The 
court then determined that the Tribes’ investigation to assess the damage 
 
40.  Id. 
41.  Id.  
42.  Id. at 577. 
43.  Id. (internal citations omitted). 
44.  Id. at 578. 
45.  Id. (“[T]here would be no fair play and no substantial justice if Teck 
could avoid suit in the place where it deliberately sent its toxic waste.”). 
46.  Id.  
47.  Id. at 578, 582. 
48.  Id. at 579. 
49.  Id. at 581 (internal quotations omitted). 
50.  Id. at 582–84. 
51.  Id. at 578–79, 581–82 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23)).  
52. Id. at 579 (citing United States v. W.R. Grace & Co., 429 F.3d 
1224, 1238 (9th Cir. 2005) (acknowledging Congress defined “removal” as a 
“sweeping” term under CERCLA)).  
2020 PAKOOTAS V. TECK COMINCO METALS, LTD. 
 
5 
was necessary in removing the hazardous materials.53 The court further 
determined the research integral to the application of CERCLA and held 
that the costs, while partially “litigation-related[,]”54 met various purposes 
of CERCLA and were rightfully awarded.55 
 Next, Teck argued the district court erred in awarding the Tribes’ 
attorney’s fees.56 Teck maintained that CERCLA does not permit recovery 
of attorney’s fees and that the Tribes did not have the power to enforce 
attorney’s fees as CERCLA’s enforcement activities.57 The Ninth Circuit 
disagreed58 and opposed Teck’s interpretation of “enforcement activities,” 
instead determining that most PRPs do not agree to a CERCLA order, 
which leads to litigation.59 The court also stated that its holding in United 
States v. Chapman60 applies equally to all government entities,61 further 
reasoning that since a CERCLA order requires litigation, that makes it an 
enforcement activity and awardable under CERCLA.62 
 Notwithstanding Chapman’s applicability, Teck further argued 
that even if attorney’s fees fall under enforcement, the Tribes do not have 
the authority to enforce a CERCLA action.63 The court stated “an Indian 
tribe [can] recover all reasonable attorney fees attributable to the litigation 
as a part of its response costs” in a CERCLA action.64 The court further 
reasoned that CERCLA clean ups need not follow a certain order or ini-
tially use the EPA for cleanup and thus, because the Tribes cleaned the 
site, they could enforce a CERCLA action and recover all associated 
costs.65 Further, under Webb v. Ada County,66 the court rejected Teck’s 
argument that the award of attorney’s fees was unreasonable, instead hold-
ing that the $4.86 million award was “reasonably proportionate” to the 
awarded investigation expenses of $3.39 million.67 
 
53.  Id. 
54.  Id. at 581. 
55.  Id. at 582.  
56.  Id. at 582–83.  
57.  Id. at 584–85.  
58  Id. at 583, 586. 
59.  Id. at 586 (relying on United States v. Chapman, 146 F.3d 1166 (9th 
Cir. 1998) (holding CERCLA “evinces an intent” to cover reasonable attorney’s 
fees)). 
60.  146 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 1998). 
61. Pakootas, 905 F.3d at 584 (quoting Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. City 
of Lodi, 302 F.3d 928, 953 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Chapman, 146 F.3d at 1175–
76)) (holding CERCLA’s attorneys’ provisions apply equally to government entities 
including Indian Tribes)).  
62.  Id.  
63.  Id. 
64.  Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).  
65.  Id. at 584–85 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25)).  
 66.  285 F.3d 829, 837 (9th Cir. 2002) 
67. Pakootas, 905 F.3d 586 (acknowledging that “CERCLA plaintiffs 
often spend some money responding to an environmental hazard and then bring a re-
sponse cost action to recover their initial outlays and to obtain a declaration that the 
responsible party will have continuing liability for the cost of finishing the job”) (in-
ternal quotation omitted)). 
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C. Divisibility Defense 
 
 Finally, the court addressed Teck’s argument that the district court 
erred in granting the Tribes’ motion for summary judgment against Teck’s 
divisibility defense.68 Teck relied “almost exclusively” on a report submit-
ted by its divisibility expert, Dr. Mark Johns, as its evidence opposing the 
Tribes’ motion.69 The Ninth Circuit determined de novo that Dr. Johns’ 
report did not present a genuine issue of material fact and did nothing to 
dissuade the district court away from the overwhelming evidence submit-
ted by the Tribes.70 The court held that aggregation of Teck’s slag alone 
was enough to damage the Upper Columbia River’s ecosystem and that 
Teck provided no basis for apportionment.71 Further the court, using 
United States v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Company,72 
stated that ordinarily the divisibility defense required that Teck show: (1) 
the environmental harm was “theoretically capable of apportionment”;73 
and (2) there is a “reasonable basis” to apportion liability, while on sum-
mary judgment the plaintiff carries the burdens of production and persua-
sion to defeat divisibility pleaded as an affirmative defense.74 The court 
held that the Tribes proved Teck did not have enough evidence to support 




 The claims argued within this case present important questions 
pertinent to the extraterritorial applicability of CERCLA, CERCLA’s pro-
visions on attorney’s fees, and what constitutes a divisibility defense under 
CERCLA. With the evolution of CERCLA expanding its reaches across 
borders, international environmental law becomes stronger. The future of 
environmental litigation will begin to center around international and 
transboundary litigation as climate change progresses and as courts begin 
to hold foreign companies liable for their hand in pollution. 
 
68.  Id. at 586–96. 
69.  Id. at 587. 
70.  Id. 589, 591 (determining that Teck’s reliance on other environmen-
tal factors showed only a possible cause of slag deposits and did not excuse Teck’s 
failure to recognize various geographical factors that caused the pollution to Lake 
Roosevelt and the Upper Columbia River).  
71.  Id. at 595.  
72.  520 F.3d 918, 942 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d on other grounds, 556 U.S. 
599 (2009). 
73.  Pakootas, 905 F.3d at 588 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 434 cmt. d (AM. LAW. INST. 1965)).  
74.  Id. at 589 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 433A(1)(b), 
434 cmt. d (AM. LAW. INST. 1965)). 
75.  Id. at 596. 
